U.S.-Led Weapons Order Shaken as Europe Accelerates ‘De-Americanized Rearmament’

U.S. security uncertainty grows and Europe’s defense dependency risks come into focus
NATO procurement axis shifts toward Airbus and Saab
European defense autonomy spreads to fighter jets and air defense networks

The defense procurement order of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), long centered on the United States, is rapidly being unsettled. In the past, NATO member states treated U.S.-made platforms as a de facto standard, but the mood has changed markedly. Italy’s adoption of the Airbus A330 MRTT, NATO’s expanding review of GlobalEye, and moves to strengthen European air defense networks all align with a broader shift away from the U.S.-centered military supply system. As uncertainty over U.S. security commitments grows, Europe is intensifying efforts to reorganize weapons systems, maintenance networks, and supply chains around its own industrial base.

Italy Finalizes Six A330 MRTTs After Dropping KC-46

According to Tenders Electronic Daily, the European Union procurement notice system, on the 25th, Italy’s Directorate of Air Armaments and Airworthiness signed a main contract last month with French aircraft manufacturer Airbus to acquire six A330 Multi Role Tanker Transport aircraft. The total contract value, including long-term integrated logistics support, stands at $1.61 billion.

The decision is significant because it effectively replaces the U.S. Boeing KC-767-series tankers that the Italian Air Force has operated for 15 years. Since 2022, Italy had pursued the introduction of Boeing’s KC-46 Pegasus. The expected contract value was about $1.3 billion. A plan to sell four existing KC-767s back to Boeing was also reviewed, but Italy halted the related process in 2024 and shifted to an open tender. Airbus is understood to have secured the project in what was effectively a sole-bid structure.

Boeing’s exclusion stemmed from chronic technical defects. In particular, camera distortion and visibility problems in the Remote Vision System, along with repeated delays in upgrades, raised questions even within the U.S. Air Force over full operational stabilization and dealt a serious blow to confidence in the platform. Yet this was only the surface-level explanation. In reality, the decision also dovetailed with the EU’s defense industrial self-reliance policy, centered on the European Defence Fund, aimed at expanding joint procurement. The calculation is to move away from U.S.-centered maintenance and logistics systems and strengthen Europe’s own maintenance, repair, overhaul, and supply-chain ecosystem.

The Airbus A330 MRTT is a proven platform already operated by South Korea, France, Britain, Australia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates. It is also the core aircraft of NATO’s Multinational MRTT Fleet program. At present, 17 countries worldwide have ordered 85 aircraft, with more than 66 delivered. Its share of the non-U.S. aerial tanker market is estimated at more than 90%.

In terms of performance, Airbus also surpasses Boeing. The A330 MRTT can carry 15-16% more fuel than the KC-46, while its cargo capacity is estimated to be about 50% higher and its troop transport capacity up to more than twice as large. It can carry up to 380 troops and perform strategic cargo transport and medical evacuation missions. This explains why European countries are gravitating toward the aircraft for long-range operational endurance and multi-mission flexibility. In particular, as the Italian Air Force expands its F-35A/B fleet, securing long-range aerial refueling capacity is essential. The A330 MRTT can substantially enhance long-range deployment operations and sustained combat air patrol capability. This also aligns with the expansion of NATO’s operational scope across the Baltic Sea, Eastern Europe, and the Red Sea.

European Early-Warning System Moves Into Boeing E-7 Vacuum

Europe’s move away from the United States is not confined to Italy. Recently, European countries have begun to regard dependence on U.S.-made weapons systems as a long-term risk. Fundamental doubts over reliance on U.S. weapons have grown among European states as skepticism toward NATO and pressure on European defense spending have repeatedly surfaced inside the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump.

The most symbolic change has emerged in NATO’s Airborne Warning and Control System program. NATO’s procurement agency, the NATO Support and Procurement Agency, had initially pursued Boeing’s E-7 Wedgetail as the successor platform to the E-3 Sentry, but the entire project was shaken after the U.S. Air Force began considering withdrawal from the E-7 program. The Dutch Ministry of Defence later officially confirmed the suspension of NATO’s E-7 acquisition plan, and Sweden’s Saab quickly moved into the vacuum. Within NATO, momentum is now growing to review Saab’s GlobalEye as a leading candidate for the next-generation early-warning platform. France and Germany are also reportedly considering the possibility of adopting GlobalEye.

GlobalEye’s rise was triggered by variables on the U.S. side. As the U.S. Air Force raised concerns after fiscal 2025 over cost increases, development delays, and survivability in high-threat environments surrounding the E-7 program, NATO’s existing procurement logic weakened. The E-7 had initially been viewed as a leading candidate to replace the E-3A, but once Washington’s commitment to sustaining the program wavered, the allied joint operating framework was also exposed to uncertainty. This is why NATO began to feel burdened by linking a core surveillance capability to U.S. procurement timelines and budget policy.

GlobalEye is an airborne early-warning and control aircraft that combines the Bombardier Global 6000/6500 business jet platform with the Erieye ER radar system. The aircraft itself is supplied by Canada’s Bombardier, while the core surveillance and command-and-control system is provided by Sweden’s Saab. This combination is regarded as an alternative capable of securing NATO-standard operability and long-range surveillance capability while moving away from Boeing-centered systems.

The political implications of selecting GlobalEye are also considerable. NATO’s AWACS fleet has long operated around Geilenkirchen Air Base in Germany and has served as a core pillar of Eastern European airspace surveillance and allied command and control. A decision to shift this capability from a Boeing platform to a Swedish-Canadian platform carries far greater significance. It signals that European member states are moving to reduce single-source dependence on U.S.-made systems even in top-tier capabilities such as surveillance, reconnaissance, and command and control.

Cracks Spread to U.S.-Made Fighter Jets and Air Defense Networks as European Defense Autonomy Accelerates

The U.S.-made monopoly is also being shaken in the fighter jet and air defense markets. In the past, NATO member states based weapons purchases on combat-proven performance and military interoperability with the United States. More recently, however, supply-chain control, software access, maintenance independence, and wartime operational autonomy have emerged as core variables. In particular, concern is rapidly spreading inside Europe that high dependence on U.S. platforms could create strategic constraints in a contingency.

A representative case is the controversy surrounding Lockheed Martin’s F-35. The F-35’s ALIS and ODIN-based maintenance and logistics systems are closely linked to U.S. servers, while software upgrades and key maintenance authorities are also managed under U.S. leadership. European defense industry officials and security experts have raised concerns that this could leave operators excessively dependent on U.S. approval systems in wartime. In particular, as the possibility of reduced U.S. involvement in NATO has been repeatedly raised since Trump’s return to power, the perception is growing within Europe that dependence on U.S.-made platforms is directly tied to political and security variables.

This is also why France has recently stepped up its campaign to sell Rafale fighter jets to European countries. French President Emmanuel Macron has repeatedly delivered the public message that Europe should prioritize the purchase of European-made weapons. The French defense industry emphasizes full operational independence as Rafale’s key advantage over the F-35. In practice, Rafale allows weapons integration and mission software modification without U.S. approval. From France’s perspective, fighter jet sales also serve to disseminate the political message of European security sovereignty.

The development landscape for sixth-generation fighter jets is moving in the same direction. The Future Combat Air System pursued by France, Germany, and Spain, and the Global Combat Air Programme jointly pursued by Britain, Italy, and Japan, both have the character of long-term strategic projects aimed at reducing dependence on next-generation U.S. platforms. Britain, in particular, has seen a growing need to preserve an independent defense ecosystem after Brexit, while Germany and France have set securing Europe’s own technological sovereignty as a core objective in moving away from the U.S.-centered airpower structure.

The shift in air defense is even more direct. After the Russia-Ukraine war, Europe has rushed to expand long-range air defense systems. Initially, the U.S. Patriot system was regarded as virtually the only option, but recently the French-Italian SAMP/T NG and Germany’s IRIS-T SLM family have been rapidly expanding their presence. In particular, SAMP/T NG, based on the Aster 30 Block 1NT missile, is being cited as a potential Patriot alternative as it strengthens ballistic missile interception capability.

In this process, the influence of U.S. defense contractors is also gradually being shaken. In the past, purchasing U.S.-made platforms functioned as a symbol of NATO cohesion. Now, however, the view is rapidly spreading inside Europe that security cooperation and industrial dependence are separate issues. The logic of an era in which performance superiority alone secured market dominance is weakening, while defense sovereignty and strategic autonomy are emerging as core criteria for procurement decisions.