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  • [China Semiconductor] AI Supremacy Upended on the Open-Source Front: U.S. Sanctions Accelerate China’s AI Independence

[China Semiconductor] AI Supremacy Upended on the Open-Source Front: U.S. Sanctions Accelerate China’s AI Independence

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6 months 1 week
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Oliver Griffin
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Oliver Griffin is a policy and tech reporter at The Economy, focusing on the intersection of artificial intelligence, government regulation, and macroeconomic strategy. Based in Dublin, Oliver has reported extensively on European Union policy shifts and their ripple effects across global markets. Prior to joining The Economy, he covered technology policy for an international think tank, producing research cited by major institutions, including the OECD and IMF. Oliver studied political economy at Trinity College Dublin and later completed a master’s in data journalism at Columbia University. His reporting blends field interviews with rigorous statistical analysis, offering readers a nuanced understanding of how policy decisions shape industries and everyday lives. Beyond his newsroom work, Oliver contributes op-eds on ethics in AI and has been a guest commentator on BBC World and CNBC Europe.

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China Accelerates AI Ecosystem Development
U.S.–China AI Gap Narrows to “Three Months”
Jensen Huang Warns: “At This Rate, China Will Overtake the U.S.”

Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang has issued a striking assessment of the global artificial intelligence (AI) race, warning that China is effectively pulling ahead of the United States through its aggressive embrace of open-source strategies. Despite the U.S. maintaining clear dominance in both economic scale and frontier AI model sophistication, Huang argued that China has gained a decisive edge in the speed of technological diffusion—spanning industrial deployment and research adoption. Indeed, China has for the first time surpassed the U.S. in download share within the open-source AI model market. While Washington continues to pursue a closed and proprietary approach, Beijing has rapidly expanded its open-source ecosystem under strong state backing.

China Wields “Open Source” as a Strategic Weapon

According to U.S.-based research institute Epoch AI, Huang recently drew a sharp comparison between American and Chinese AI competitiveness. He acknowledged that U.S.-developed cutting-edge AI models remain “world-class,” roughly six months ahead of their nearest global peers, but stressed that such technical superiority does not guarantee long-term industrial dominance. The decisive factor, he emphasized, lies in open-source accessibility. Huang noted that the vast majority of the world’s roughly 1.4 million AI models are open-source—and in this arena, China has already pulled significantly ahead. By opting for openness rather than exclusivity, both Beijing and Huawei have rapidly expanded their ecosystems, broadening access and accelerating the diffusion of AI technologies.

Huang further underscored the foundational role of open source in nurturing startups and academic research. “Without open source, startups cannot grow, universities cannot conduct scientific research, and scientists cannot even experiment,” he asserted. He pointed out that the technological backbone of today’s IT infrastructure—Linux, Kubernetes, PyTorch—was all built on open-source foundations, adding, “Their prosperity is now inseparable from AI itself.”

His remarks extend beyond a simple hierarchy of technological capability, pointing instead to his long-held thesis that “the speed and attitude with which societies adopt technology determine the winners of industrial revolutions.” China, by leveraging open-source tools, is accelerating AI adoption across all sectors of society, while the U.S., preoccupied with elite and closed technologies, is falling behind in ecosystem breadth and inclusivity.

Semiconductor Ambitions Amid U.S. Sanctions

China’s rise in open-source AI is already reshaping the global balance. Research by MIT and the open-source AI platform Hugging Face found that Chinese-origin AI models accounted for 17% of all new open-source downloads over the past year, overtaking U.S. developers’ 15.8% share for the first time. Chinese models such as DeepSeek and Zhipu AI predominantly use the Apache 2.0 license, which allows free commercial utilization—further accelerating ecosystem expansion.

This shift carries profound implications. While major U.S. AI firms have developed highly capable models, they have largely restricted access through closed systems or paid APIs. China, by contrast, has opted for openness, supported by government and industry alike. This approach has enabled the release of efficient models that deliver competitive performance with fewer compute resources. In parallel, Beijing has eased regulatory barriers and intensified its push for semiconductor self-sufficiency.

At the national level, China’s target of achieving 70% domestic AI chip production by 2030 represents the culmination of its semiconductor industrialization drive. At the 2025 World Artificial Intelligence Conference (WAIC), Beijing also emphasized the “globalization of AI governance,” pledging to promote UN-led standardization, Global South inclusion, and open-source infrastructure expansion—an approach that stands in stark contrast to the research-lab–centric model of the U.S. and EU.

Experts say China’s AI development is no longer that of a follower but increasingly the benchmark of “AI efficiency.” The rivalry between Washington and Beijing now plays out across multiple fronts. In software, particularly large language models (LLMs), the performance gap has nearly vanished. Stanford University’s 2025 AI Index report found that on benchmarks such as MMLU (Massive Multitask Language Understanding), the U.S.–China performance gap shrank from double digits in 2023 to just 0.3–3.7 percentage points by late 2024.

On LMSYS’s objective Chatbot Arena leaderboard, the best U.S. model scored 1,385 points, only about 1.7% higher than China’s top-performing model as of February 2025—underscoring how China has compensated for hardware disadvantages through algorithmic efficiency and open-source acceleration. While U.S. export controls continue to block Chinese firms from using Nvidia’s latest AI chips, Beijing’s companies have found ways to optimize around these constraints.

China’s AI sector is now leveraging cost efficiency and open-source dominance to challenge the U.S. directly. The “DeepSeek Moment” in January marked a turning point: the Chinese startup’s R1 model demonstrated inference performance on par with OpenAI’s GPT-4 Turbo despite U.S. semiconductor sanctions, triggering what analysts dubbed an “AI Sputnik shock.” DeepSeek’s achievement was driven by a novel mixture-of-experts (MoE) architecture and algorithmic innovation that maximized efficiency under hardware limitations.

U.S. Congress Pushes Back Against Nvidia’s Lobbying

Nvidia’s lobbying campaign to ease U.S. export restrictions on AI chips to China stems directly from this dynamic. The company argues that current sanctions, rather than constraining China, have accelerated its self-reliance while undermining U.S. leadership in AI hardware. Nvidia has mobilized extensive lobbying efforts to reverse these policies, but Washington remains divided. While the White House shows tentative signs of flexibility, Congress is hardening its stance.

U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer told Fox News on December 7 that “export control policies for advanced semiconductors are always fluid,” adding that “as technology evolves and access expands, the reference point for control criteria can be adjusted.” Though Washington has long maintained strict export curbs, recent remarks suggest a potential policy recalibration. Critics within the industry argue that sanctions have backfired—accelerating Chinese semiconductor innovation while harming U.S. chipmakers like Nvidia.

The Trump administration has reportedly considered allowing limited exports of Nvidia’s high-performance H200 AI chip to China. The H200 outperforms the H20 model, which is currently the highest-spec chip approved for restricted export to China. Greer said, “The Trump administration clearly agrees that we must be extremely cautious about sending leading-edge technologies, semiconductors, or other advanced products to China or elsewhere,” but added, “adjustments to export controls can always occur.”

However, the U.S. Senate reacted sharply. On December 4, bipartisan senators introduced the Safe Chips Act to prevent the administration from loosening restrictions. The bill mandates a complete ban—over a 30-month period—on export licenses for AI chips with higher performance than currently approved levels to China, North Korea, Russia, and Iran. It also requires the Commerce Department to notify Congress one month before any regulatory change after that period.

Industry analysts describe U.S.–China semiconductor policy as approaching a decisive inflection point. While lifting restrictions could accelerate Chinese technological advancement, maintaining them risks further isolating U.S. firms from the world’s largest AI market. Yet, consensus among experts is that Washington’s containment strategy has paradoxically strengthened China’s self-sufficiency.

Huawei’s case exemplifies this dual effect. Beginning in 2019, U.S. sanctions cut Huawei off from advanced chips, equipment, and EDA design software, halting production of its 5G smartphones and slashing revenue by 30% within a year. But the shock soon catalyzed a national drive for technological independence. Huawei implemented a “spare tire” strategy, activating backup R&D projects and investing through internal funds in more than 60 semiconductor startups. Supported by Beijing’s aggressive localization policies, Huawei in 2023 successfully launched the Mate 60 Pro—equipped with a domestically produced 7-nanometer chip. The episode underscores a broader paradox: while U.S. restrictions have constrained China’s access to cutting-edge Western technology, they have simultaneously reinforced the structural resilience and autonomy of China’s semiconductor ecosystem.

Picture

Member for

6 months 1 week
Real name
Oliver Griffin
Bio
Oliver Griffin is a policy and tech reporter at The Economy, focusing on the intersection of artificial intelligence, government regulation, and macroeconomic strategy. Based in Dublin, Oliver has reported extensively on European Union policy shifts and their ripple effects across global markets. Prior to joining The Economy, he covered technology policy for an international think tank, producing research cited by major institutions, including the OECD and IMF. Oliver studied political economy at Trinity College Dublin and later completed a master’s in data journalism at Columbia University. His reporting blends field interviews with rigorous statistical analysis, offering readers a nuanced understanding of how policy decisions shape industries and everyday lives. Beyond his newsroom work, Oliver contributes op-eds on ethics in AI and has been a guest commentator on BBC World and CNBC Europe.