Yanolja’s Valuation at USD 10.3 Billion? Nasdaq Listing Drifts Further Amid Bubble Concerns

Yanolja’s targeted corporate valuation reaches up to USD 10.3 billion
Accumulated deficit approaches USD 2.05 billion, financial burden persists
To avoid becoming “another Coupang,” profitability must be proven

Yanolja’s listing on the U.S. Nasdaq market has seen no progress for more than a year. An excessively lofty valuation target appears to be blocking its path to an initial public offering (IPO). Although Yanolja had fueled market expectations with steady revenue growth in recent years, its profitability has sharply deteriorated, undermining the corporate valuation levels previously mentioned. While its largest shareholder SoftBank has been anticipating an exit-driven return akin to the earlier Coupang case, crossing the Nasdaq threshold will be difficult unless the overvaluation controversy is resolved.

Excessively High Valuation Target

According to the investment banking (IB) industry on the 24th, CEO Lee recently conveyed to management and its IPO underwriters (Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley) his intention to list the company at a valuation of USD 8.9–10.3 billion. Yanolja originally planned to begin Nasdaq listing procedures in July last year. Its initial valuation target was reportedly USD 7–9 billion. Yet there has been no sign of actual listing progress to date.

Yanolja’s motivation for pursuing a Nasdaq listing is to shed its image as a lodging platform company and transition into a comprehensive travel-tech enterprise spanning both business-to-consumer (B2C) and business-to-business (B2B) segments. Founded in 2007 as a lodging information community, Yanolja has sought to transform itself beyond a domestic accommodation-booking platform into a company handling global travel data and hotel-operations technology. In 2019, it began expanding its enterprise-solutions business by securing cloud-based hotel-operation systems and a global B2B supply chain.

At the end of 2023, Yanolja recruited Alexander Ibrahim, formerly of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), as its Chief Financial Officer (CFO). Last year, the company also established a U.S. subsidiary and opened an office in Manhattan, accelerating its global expansion centered on the North American market. In addition, it strengthened its board composition by appointing a foreign outside director with accounting expertise to align with global governance standards.

However, the USD 8.9–10.3 billion valuation reportedly sought by CEO Lee far exceeds Yanolja’s valuation at the time of its large-scale fundraising four years ago. In 2021, SoftBank Vision Fund invested approximately USD 1.58 billion in Yanolja, valuing the company at USD 5.48 billion. The gap widens further when compared with its over-the-counter stock price. As of the 24th on Se­curities Plus Unlisted, Yanolja’s share price stood at USD 18.63, only one-third of the USD 48–55 range seen in early 2021. Its current market capitalization is roughly USD 1.92 billion; even when calculated at the peak price over the past three years (June 10 last year), the implied valuation is USD 4.97 billion—still only half of Yanolja’s desired valuation.

Rising Revenue, Falling Profitability — A Chronic Pattern

Even applying valuation multiples from comparable overseas-listed companies suggests that the USD 8.9–10.3 billion target lacks realism. Yanolja currently describes itself as a global Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) company, given SaaS valuations far exceed those of lodging businesses. Yet even under these favorable assumptions, the desired valuation remains inflated. Applying the average EV/Sales multiple of 5–7 times used for global SaaS firms to Yanolja’s revenue still yields much lower figures. Yanolja’s revenue for Q1–Q3 this year was USD 521 million; assuming annual revenue of USD 685 million, applying 5–7× revenue multiples and adding USD 137 million in net cash places Yanolja’s valuation between USD 3.69 billion and USD 5.11 billion. This falls short of both the expectations of financial investors (FIs) and prior investment valuations.

Using EV/EBITDA metrics yields even lower results. With global SaaS companies trading at EV/EBITDA multiples of roughly 18–20×, applying these to Yanolja’s estimated EBITDA for this year (USD 82 million) implies a valuation in the mid-USD 1 billion range. Applying the average valuation of lodging-platform companies such as Airbnb and Expedia would place Yanolja’s valuation between the high-USD 700 million and low-USD 2.7 billion range. EV/EBITDA would put it in the high-USD 700 million band, while EV/Sales would place it in the low-USD 2.7 billion tier. Moreover, prolonged high-interest-rate conditions have generally depressed valuations for tech and platform businesses compared to when SoftBank invested.

Compounding matters, Yanolja’s stalled IPO timeline has further weakened market sentiment. Although revenue continues to climb, operating profit and net income remain volatile or declining. Revenue rose from USD 226 million in 2021 to USD 413 million in 2022 and USD 633 million last year. However, operating profit fluctuated: USD 9.5 million in 2022, USD 1.8 million in 2023, USD 33.7 million in 2024, and USD 1.7 million in the first half of this year. Net losses continue to accumulate, expanding the company’s deficit. As of mid-year, total liabilities stood at USD 1.07 billion; the debt-to-equity ratio has surged from 14.7% in 2021 to 133% today. Yanolja posted losses in both Q1 and Q2 this year, and as of end-June, accumulated deficit alone amounted to USD 2.05 billion. Without reducing this deficit during the IPO process, concerns about capital impairment could intensify.

Coupang’s Bubble Listing — Stock Price Halved, Facing Lawsuits

Given this backdrop, an aggressive IPO relying solely on growth narratives risks market rejection. Coupang’s case proves this point. Yanolja is often labeled “the second Coupang,” owing to its backing by SoftBank’s Masayoshi Son and its ambition for a Nasdaq listing. However, considering Coupang’s subsequent trajectory, the comparison may be far from flattering. Ahead of its IPO, Coupang posted an operating loss exceeding USD 342 million in 2020, leading it to adopt a price-to-sales ratio (PSR) for valuation. When Coupang listed on March 11, 2021, its closing-price market capitalization reached USD 88.65 billion. The excitement, however, proved short-lived. According to the NYSE, as of the 23rd (local time), Coupang’s market capitalization stood at USD 50 billion—slashed in half within three years.

The primary reason was sluggish profitability improvement. Coupang recorded its first quarterly profit eight years after launching Rocket Delivery, achieving USD 67.8 million in operating income on USD 4.58 billion in revenue in Q3 2022—a margin of just 1.5%. Over the following year, margins remained depressed. In Q3 2023, revenue was USD 5.41 billion with USD 80.9 million in operating income—an operating margin of 1.4%. Although investors believed platform companies with strong growth could eventually convert scale into profit, this expectation did not materialize.

As a result, long-standing speculation that Coupang’s valuation was inflated evolved into full-scale bubble accusations. Additional doubts emerged over the company’s operational independence and managerial competency as Masayoshi Son’s high-profile investment losses—including the collapse of WeWork—triggered broader skepticism toward SoftBank-backed firms.

These issues culminated in litigation. The New York City Employees’ Retirement System and other shareholders sued Coupang in 2021, claiming its IPO filings contained false information. They alleged Coupang had concealed poor working conditions at logistics centers, manipulated search results, instructed employees to write reviews for private-label (PB) products, and pressured suppliers on pricing. They asserted that the stock price fell more than 50% within a year due to investigations by the Korea Fair Trade Commission and a major logistics-center fire. Although a U.S. District Court in the South this September ruled in favor of Coupang—finding insufficient evidence of intentional deception—the episode serves as a reminder that U.S. investors may demand far stricter profitability standards from Yanolja.