[U.S.–China Tensions] Post-summit signals of divergence: trade adjustments and security caution advance in parallel

Policy language hardens around “reducing dependence on the opposing bloc”
Repeated boundary-setting weakens the premise of an integrated market
China criticizes what it calls a “retreat from free-trade norms”

While a phone call between the U.S. and Chinese leaders concluded with an agreement to expand purchases of U.S. soybeans and broadly positive assessments, subtle tensions have surfaced beneath the surface. Immediately after the call, differences over the Taiwan issue were again laid bare, underscoring a dynamic in which cooperation and vigilance operate simultaneously. Unlike trade issues that can be adjusted relatively quickly, core technology and security agendas are being managed on separate tracks. As the United States moves to design new rules around critical minerals and supply-chain restructuring, attention is turning to China’s response and the substance of its countermeasures.

Security-anchored signals of market separation widen

U.S. President Donald Trump held a phone call the previous day with Chinese President Xi Jinping to discuss the Taiwan issue and an expansion of purchases of U.S. soybeans. After the call, President Trump said it was “long and thorough, and very positive.” He explained that China is considering increasing purchases of U.S. soybeans to 20 million metric tons this season and has agreed to import 25 million tons next season. On Taiwan, however, he avoided specific comment, responding to related questions by saying that “both sides recognize the importance of the relationship.”

Diplomatic circles interpreted the call as a signal that U.S.–China relations have entered a “managed separation” phase focused on sensitive domains. The exchange demonstrated that adjustment and compromise remain possible in areas with relatively low political and security sensitivity, such as agricultural trade, while also symbolically revealing the coexistence of security tensions and economic coordination that defines the current relationship. Soybean futures on the Chicago Board of Trade jumped more than 3 percent immediately after the call, hitting a two-month high, before retreating to around seasonal averages.

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in its own readout, said President Xi raised the Taiwan issue directly and urged the United States to handle arms sales to Taiwan “with the utmost prudence.” The statement reflected Beijing’s long-standing position that Taiwan is Chinese territory and that separatism will not be tolerated. The United States approved $11.1 billion in arms sales to Taiwan last December. Against that backdrop, President Trump’s decision to emphasize the importance of relations while avoiding detail on Taiwan points to Washington’s approach of managing economic negotiations separately from security disputes.

Since an agreement on a one-year trade truce reached on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit held in South Korea last October, bilateral ties have appeared relatively stable. Beneath that surface, however, the United States has framed competition with China as a national-security issue, tightening restrictions on advanced equipment and technology transfers, while China has accelerated efforts toward self-reliance through large-scale investment. Potential flashpoints—including China’s outreach to U.S. allies, U.S. sanctions on Venezuela and Iran, and competition over critical-mineral supply chains—remain unresolved. Even as leader-level dialogue continues, “reducing dependence on the opposing bloc” has hardened into policy language across trade, investment, and procurement.

Multilateral push across procurement, processing, and distribution

The most concrete policy manifestation of U.S.–China economic decoupling has emerged in supply chains for critical minerals, including rare earths. On the 4th, the United States convened a ministerial meeting at the State Department in Washington and formally announced the creation of a “critical minerals trade bloc.” Vice President J.D. Vance said the past year had driven home “how dependent our economy has become on critical minerals,” and presented a new order binding allies and partners. Delegations from 54 countries and the European Union attended, including South Korea’s foreign minister, alongside representatives from Australia, India, Japan, and countries across Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Washington’s view is that reliance on market forces failed to counter China’s low-price supply strategy. Vance argued that the current global critical-minerals market “is not functioning properly,” describing supply chains as fragile and overly concentrated, with prices persistently suppressed. He outlined the introduction of stage-by-stage “reference prices” and coordinating tariffs to maintain them, asserting that China’s low-priced output had derailed new mines and large-scale refining projects elsewhere.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio branded the initiative FORGE—the Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement. He said 55 countries have expressed willingness to cooperate and that many have already signed participation agreements. “Critical minerals underpin everything from the devices we use every day to national defense,” Rubio said, adding that the goal is to build a secure, sustainable, and reasonably priced global market. He warned that excessive concentration of supply in a single country can be exploited as geopolitical leverage—an implicit reference to China.

The trade-bloc plan is also linked to financial and stockpiling policies. On the 2nd, President Trump announced a public-private project dubbed “Project Vault,” committing $12 billion to strategic stockpiles of critical minerals that would be prioritized for automakers and electronics manufacturers during supply disruptions. The U.S. government has also said it will deploy up to $100 billion in lending and investment authority to intervene directly across the value chain—from mining to refining and processing.

China opposes “blocization,” offers no alternative

China has publicly opposed the U.S.-led critical-minerals bloc. At a regular briefing on the 5th, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said countries have a responsibility to play a constructive role in maintaining the stability and security of global production and supply chains for critical minerals, and that preserving an open and inclusive international trading environment serves common interests. The remarks are widely seen as an attempt to challenge U.S. efforts to institutionalize new rules—including price floors—by invoking free-trade principles.

Meanwhile, the U.S. initiative is moving into an implementation phase, with participation expanding and rules taking shape. Washington has already reached agreements or frameworks with Japan, Australia, the EU, Mexico, and others. China has labeled these moves “exclusive blocization,” but lacks practical tools to block them at the execution stage. Beijing’s emphasis on an “open and inclusive trading environment” has so far remained a restatement of multilateral principles rather than a basis for an alternative order.

On security issues, China has also taken a cautious stance. Addressing the expiration of the New START nuclear arms-reduction treaty between the United States and Russia, Lin said China has “always maintained a very prudent and responsible position” on nuclear weapons, stressing that its nuclear forces are “not at all on the same level” as those of the U.S. and Russia and that it will not join arms-reduction talks at this stage. The message signals opposition to economic blocization while declining inclusion in new security frameworks.

Overall, China’s response has been consistent in opposing U.S.-led order-building, but it has yet to present concrete tools to block or replace it. There is no indication that Beijing has directly intervened in the rule-making process around critical-mineral supply chains or proposed a viable alternative. The trajectory suggests that, in U.S.–China economic relations, traditional multilateral norms may give way to sector-specific rules and transaction structures centered on alliances and consultative groupings. Across diplomatic circles, the prevailing view is that China’s public objections are insufficient to reverse an already advancing bloc-based order.