Saudi Arabia and UAE Launch Retaliatory Strikes on Iran, Dealing Inevitable Blow to Tehran’s ‘Middle East Hegemon’ Status
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‘Eye-for-an-eye’ Saudi Arabia confirmed to have carried out direct mainland strikes in March UAE behind Lavan Island attack, signaling shift among Gulf states Regional security order may be reshaped amid erosion of Iran’s authority

As the United States and Iran continue a fragile ceasefire on thin ice, it has belatedly emerged that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates secretly launched retaliatory attacks on Iran before the ceasefire took effect. The move by Gulf monarchies, which had previously refrained from direct confrontation, to raise the level of military intervention is expected to inflict serious fractures on the psychological superiority and asymmetric deterrence Iran has long enjoyed in the Middle East. With its military infrastructure and air defense network shaken by U.S. and Israeli airstrikes, Iran is now assessed to have suffered a considerable blow to its prestige and authority as even Saudi Arabia and the UAE, countries Tehran had regarded as a tier below, moved into direct action.
Saudi Arabia Directly Attacked Iran in March
According to Reuters on the 13th, local time, the Saudi air force is known to have secretly struck mainland Iran several times in late March in response to Iranian attacks on Saudi territory. The specific targets have not been confirmed, but Saudi Arabia thereby sent a clear message of retaliation. It marks the first time Saudi Arabia has directly targeted the mainland of Iran, its rival in Middle Eastern hegemony and Islamic sectarian competition—Saudi Arabia as the leading Sunni power and Iran as the leading Shiite power—making the move highly unusual.
Saudi Arabia’s shift in posture goes beyond diplomatic pressure. The operation is interpreted as a strong signal that Saudi Arabia will no longer remain solely on the defensive as the security umbrella long provided by the United States was breached and civilian facilities and oil infrastructure came under attack. In late February, immediately after U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran, Tehran carried out drone and missile attacks targeting Saudi Arabia’s eastern oil fields, the Ras Tanura refinery, and Prince Sultan Air Base.
Since then, the mood inside Saudi Arabia has rapidly turned hawkish. According to major Arab outlet Al Jazeera, Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan publicly warned in mid-March that “there are limits to the patience of Gulf states,” effectively signaling the possibility of military response. The Saudi Foreign Ministry also raised the pressure, saying Iran would pay “the greatest strategic price” if it continued its attacks. In practice, Saudi Arabia began expanding both diplomatic and military measures. On March 21, it expelled Iranian defense-related figures and signed a contract to introduce Ukrainian-made interceptor missiles. At the same time, it activated a defense cooperation agreement with Pakistan, securing support in fighter jets and troops.
Middle East experts view the indications of secret airstrikes as meaning the Saudi-Iran rapprochement has effectively collapsed. The two countries had sought to ease tensions after agreeing in 2023, under Chinese mediation, to normalize diplomatic relations. Even when the United States pushed ahead with “Project Freedom,” a military operation in the Strait of Hormuz, Saudi Arabia avoided full-scale involvement by rejecting U.S. requests to use its airspace and bases. Yet the atmosphere changed abruptly once Iranian attacks expanded to Saudi economic infrastructure. Saudi Arabia has traditionally relied on its military alliance with the United States, but amid vulnerabilities exposed during the recent war, it appears to have made a decisive move toward “direct response.” This also intersects with changes in the Middle East’s power structure. Saudi Arabia had focused on easing regional tensions for economic modernization and the Neom City project, but repeated direct Iranian attacks appear to have led Riyadh to conclude that it could no longer maintain only a defensive posture.
UAE, Moving Closer to the U.S., Also Secretly Struck Iran
Retaliatory attacks against Iran did not stop with Saudi Arabia. The UAE, which had been hit by more than 2,800 missiles and drones from Iran, also bombed refinery facilities on Lavan Island off Iran’s southern coast on the 8th of last month, just before the temporary ceasefire. While traditionally maintaining close ties with the United States, the UAE, like other Gulf states, had taken a cautious stance on providing its airspace before the war. But that position is assessed to have changed after Iran, in retaliation against the United States, made neighboring Gulf states targets following the outbreak of war.
The UAE is one of the countries most exposed to Iranian attacks since the war began. Images of skyscrapers burning under Iran’s indiscriminate strikes were broadcast in real time, dealing broad damage to aviation, transportation, tourism, and real estate markets, while also tarnishing its reputation as the Middle East’s financial, commercial, and tourism hub. Sources familiar with the matter said this situation fundamentally altered the UAE’s strategic outlook, prompting it to view Iran as a “Rogue Actor” threatening its economic and social model.
The UAE is currently taking the clearest hardline stance toward Iran among Gulf states. At the same time, it is pursuing economic pressure measures, including closing Iran-related facilities inside the country and restricting the entry and transit of Iranian nationals. In addition, the UAE expressed support for a draft United Nations Security Council resolution promoted by the United States to weaken Iranian influence in the Strait of Hormuz. The resolution failed to pass because it included language that could authorize the use of force. Furthermore, the UAE has elevated military cooperation with Israel since the war began, including receiving support in Iron Dome batteries and operating personnel, Israel’s core air defense system.

Gulf Security Formula May Change
Military security experts believe Saudi and UAE attacks on Iran are highly likely to fundamentally shake the “psychological resistance line” of the Gulf security order. Iran has long built powerful fear and deterrence among regional states through the Middle East’s largest missile arsenal, a network of proxies, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. But as Saudi Arabia and the UAE directly struck the Iranian mainland and core energy facilities, the perception that “Iran is also a fully attackable target” is rapidly spreading inside the Middle East. In particular, analysts say Iran’s existing internal perception—that Gulf states are merely “economic states” hiding behind the U.S. security umbrella—could also be substantially shaken.
This is highly likely to weaken Iran’s bargaining power in future end-of-war negotiations with the United States. Major think tanks, including the Royal United Services Institute and Chatham House in Britain, have identified the “offensive turn by Gulf states” as a core change in this war. In the past, Saudi Arabia and the UAE had been extremely reluctant to engage in direct conflict because of the possibility of Iranian retaliation and damage to their economic infrastructure. This time, however, they chose limited counterstrikes under the judgment that continued Iranian attacks could produce even greater strategic losses. This is interpreted as meaning regional states have confirmed that Iran’s existing deterrence is no longer as absolute as it once was.
Within Iran, a significant political and psychological shock is also widely expected to be unavoidable. For decades, Iran has built a political narrative as the center of the “Axis of Resistance” against the United States, Israel, and Gulf monarchies. But experts say the fact that Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which Iran had regarded as militarily inferior, also took action in this war carries implications beyond tactical damage. This is because the very “pride of a Middle Eastern hegemon,” one of the key foundations on which the Iranian regime has maintained internal cohesion, could be damaged. Indeed, recent analyses have suggested that discontent is spreading inside Iran over the prolonged war, economic hardship, and repeated air defense failures.
Moreover, Gulf states are also moving to redesign their Middle East security strategies in the wake of this war. Saudi Arabia and the UAE had long invested in easing regional tensions to support economic diversification and the construction of financial and tourism hubs. But as Iran’s drone and missile attacks targeted oil facilities, airports, data centers, and tourism infrastructure, a sense of crisis has grown that a defense-centered strategy alone cannot guarantee national survival. In a recent report, the U.S. think tank Atlantic Council assessed that “Gulf states have realized they are far more vulnerable than they had believed, and at the same time confirmed that Iran, too, is not invincible.” In practice, the UAE and Saudi Arabia are rapidly shifting toward an integrated offensive-defensive strategy after the war, including expanding air defense networks, strengthening ISR capabilities, and deepening military cooperation with Israel.